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Mississippi's NEW EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION RULES:
THE Ferguson GUIDELINES AND VALUATION
Thomas W Crockett*
Walter P Neely**
Although Mississippi has no detailed statutory system for dividing property be-
tween spouses in the event of a divorce, it now has a system of equitable distribu-
tion with an elaborate set of guidelines on dividing marital property. How did we
get here, and what does it mean?
Until the mid-1980s, the Mississippi Supreme Court construed the statute pro-
viding that the court should make such orders as are "equitable and just,"' which
has been on the books for over a century and a half, as principally providing for the
support of a virtuous and deserving wife by her former husband to the extent of his
means. Only in the last decade has the court begun fashioning a more reasonable
system of dividing property, taking into account the changing position of women in
our society and leading to a system of equitable distribution of marital assets .
It is not surprising that, given the nature of the process and the inherent limita-
tions in the shaping of common law, these guidelines and factors are not always
consistent. One must remember that these rules are not the product of a systematic
study of the problem, but are the product of a number of cases in which the court is
called upon, based upon the factual situation before it, either to affirm or reverse a
chancellor's finding and assert the rationale for its decision. Since the court is at-
tempting to provide guidance for future decisions, much of what is written in the
opinions is advisory in nature, and thus dicta. Considering these limitations on the
decision-making process, the court has fashioned a reasonably workable set of
guidelines. One criticism and caveat: As the court has set out these rules, state-
ments contained in the advisory portions of the opinions may not have been thor-
oughly litigated nor briefed by the parties. Thus, of necessity, they are not as well
thought out by the court. Therefore, all of these rules should not be accepted as
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The authors are indebted to Aileen McNeill for her thorough research in exploring the political and economic
condition of women in Mississippi since pre-Civil War days, and examining the effect this change in circum-
stances had on the court's decisions in interpreting the predecessors of Mississippi Code Annotated § 93-5-23
(1994), which has remained on the books substantially unchanged since at least 1846. To the surprise of both the
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tween spouses in a divorce remained substantially unchanged until the mid- 1980s.
1. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (1994).
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being written in stone. As new factual situations are presented, the body of law
will, of course, grow.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
Mississippi's version of equitable distribution evolved from the lump sum ali-
mony award; however, it is more in the nature of an award to the payee spouse of
an interest rightfully owned by the payee, rather than a fulfillment of a spouse's
duty to support the other spouse. The principal differences are:
(1) The court may order a divestiture of title from one spouse to the other,
rather than going through the mechanics of impressing an equitable lien on the as-
set.
(2) Fault, even adultery by the payee spouse, is not a factor unless it affected the
accumulation of the property.
(3) The disparity between the separate estates of the spouses has diminished in
its importance.
(4) Homemaking services are presumptively as important as breadwinning
services.
The first case in Mississippi in which equitable distribution as a distinct concept
was recognized was Jones v. Jones.3 The majority opinion affirmed an award of
lump sum alimony reflecting an equitable division of the marital property of the
spouses.4 Justice Lenore Prather, in her concurring opinion, reached the same
result, but advocated that the court do away with the step of placing an equitable
lien on the property and simply require a transfer of title from one spouse to the
other.' Jones was significant also because the court specifically found that the
payee spouse had no great need for the distribution; she was simply entitled to it
by her contributions to its accumulation. 6
Cleveland v. Cleveland' followed the lead in Jones reversing a lump sum alimony
award as being inadequate;8 and, relying on factors set out in Cheatham v. Chea-
tham,9 held that the award should be increased, and that the spouse was entitled to
an equitable share of the property accumulated during the marriage. " Box v. Box11
reversed a chancellor's findings of fact and pointed out the distinction between a
lump sum award and an award of periodic alimony.12 By this time, lump sum ali-
mony was beginning to look more and more like equitable distribution. In Pratt v.
Pratt, 3 the court recognized that the husband was also entitled to lump sum
3. 532 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1988).
4. Id. at 580-81.
5. Id. at 583 (Prather, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 580-81 (Robertson, J.).
7. 600 So. 2d 193 (Miss. 1992).
8. Id. at 197.
9. 537 So. 2d 435, 438 (Miss. 1988).
10. Cleveland, 600 So. 2d at 198.
11. 622 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 1993).
12. Id. at 288-90.
13. 623 So. 2d 258 (Miss. 1993).
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alimony, but refused to award it to him." In Bland v. Bland,"5 the court reaffirmed
its view that the most important factor to be considered in awarding lump sum ali-
mony was the separate income or separate estate of the parties6 This is one of the
distinguishing features between lump sum alimony and equitable distribution, in
which cases disparity of separate estates is of little significance. Draper v. Draper7
removed the last barrier to equitable distribution by stating unequivocally that the
chancellor had the power to order a party to convey title to both real estate and per-
sonal property in a divorce proceeding. 8 The stage was now set for equitable
division.
Equitable division as we know it today came into full flower in Ferguson v.
Ferguson. " Justice Prather wrote the majority opinion, which essentially adopted
her concurring opinion in Jones and provided for the equitable division of marital
assets.2" Before dealing with how marital assets are divided, however, one must
first determine what constitutes marital assets. Hemsley v. Hemsley,21 decided the
same day as Ferguson, set out the following rule: "Assets acquired or accumulated
during the course of a marriage are subject to equitable division unless it can be
shown by proof that such assets are attributable to one of the parties' separate es-
tates prior to the marriage or outside the marriage."22 This definition may be a bit
simplistic; but, given the limitations of the decision-making process, it may be the
best the court could do under the circumstances. Johnson v. Johnson23 provides
additional guidance on this issue. Even though most of this guidance consists of
advice to the chancellor for use on remand, it is a unanimous decision comporting
generally with the rules of other jurisdictions and contains several important
points:
(1) It reaffirms the Hemsley rule that domestic contributions are presumed as
valuable as breadwinning contributions, and that all property acquired after the
marriage is subject to the presumption that it is marital property, but this presump-
tion may be rebutted.
24
(2) It provides that separate property may be transmuted into marital property
by commingling, and then transmuted back into separate property by un-
commingling25 (whether this rule will stand the test of vigorous advocacy remains
to be seen).
14. Id. at 262, 264.
15. 629 So. 2d 582 (Miss. 1993).
16. Id. at 587.
17. 627 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1993).
18. Id. at 305.
19. 639 So. 2d921 (Miss. 1994).
20. Id. at 927.
21. 639 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1994).
22. Id. at 914.
23. No. 92-CA-00957, 1994 WL 707269 (Miss. Dec. 21, 1994).
24. Id. at *3.
25. Id. at *4.
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(3) It specifically holds that separate debts of a spouse, while not affecting the
nature of the property as marital or not, will affect the amount of the marital prop-
erty to be awarded.2"
Davis v. Davis27 provides guidance on what constitutes marriage for the pur-
pose of determining marital property, ultimately holding that mere cohabitation
did not constitute marriage.28 However, Chrismond v. Chrismond9 indicates that
cohabitation coupled with a mistaken belief that one is married may well be suffic-
ient to constitute a marriage.3" These are indeed interesting times for divorce prac-
titioners.
Ferguson not only announced the principle of equitable distribution, it set out
guidelines which, today, are the most important guidelines for chancellors and di-
vorce practitioners. Even in his dissent in Ferguson, Chief Justice Armis Hawkins
referred to them as "excellent factors; "" and, today, these guidelines are now ac-
cepted by all members of the court.3 2 This is not to say that the pre-Ferguson fac-
tors have disappeared. Ferguson itself recognized that the guidelines for periodic
lump sum alimony and child support set out in previous cases were still viable.3
This view was confirmed by subsequent cases."
Let us now look at the Ferguson guidelines3" and consider them in light of both
earlier and later decisions.
A. Substantial Contribution to the Accumulation of Property
1. Direct or Indirect Economic Contribution to the Acquisition of Property
Substantial contribution to the accumulation of property is the most prominent
of all the guidelines. In Ruff v. Ruff,38 Chief Justice Hawkins, speaking for eight
members of the court,37 in reversing and remanding a chancellor's decision gave
the following as his main advice on remand: "[A] chancellor must make a careful
analysis of the parties' economic contributions to the marriage."8
This contribution can be that of a homemaker, as well as that of a breadwin-
ner.39 In Hemsley, the court stated that there would be a presumption of an equal
contribution to the marital assets.4" However, later cases held that this
26. Id.
27. 643 So. 2d 931 (Miss. 1994).
28. Id. at 936.
29. 52 So. 2d 624 (Miss.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 878 (1951).
30. Chrismond, 52 So. 2d at 630.
31. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 938 (Miss. 1994) (Hawkins, C.J., dissenting).
32. See Pierce v. Pierce, 648 So. 2d 523, 529-30 (Miss. 1994) (Lee, J., dissenting).
33. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929.
34. Pierce, 648 So. 2d at 525-26.
35. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 928.
36. 645 So. 2d 944 (Miss. 1994).
37. Justice Chuck McRae concurred in the result only. Id. at 954.
38. Id. at 947.
39. See Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 876 (Miss. 1986).
40. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994).
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presumption should not be relied upon, and evidence should be presented suffic-
ient to allow the chancellor to make a finding of fact as to each party's contribution
to the marital assets.4" In any event, it is now well established that the services of a
homemaker are an indirect contribution to the acquisition of property, and the
homemaker will share in the marital assets."
Recognizing the value of homemaking services should signal an end to unfair
results such as those found in Tutor v. Tutor.' Dr. Tutor was a neurosurgeon who
had a net worth, even without considering the value of his lucrative practice, in
the neighborhood of $1,000,000." Mrs. Tutor had worked through her forty
years of marriage and contributed substantially to the income of the family. " The
chancellor awarded her $2500 per month alimony and a lump sum award of
$50,000. 4" On appeal, the lump sum was increased to $150,000." 7 Under
Ferguson, decided six years later, the equitable distribution award more likely
would have been in the range of $300,000 to $500,000.
2. Contribution to the Stability and Harmony of the Marital and Family Relation-
ships as Measured by the Quality, Quantity of Time Spent on Family Duties, and
Duration of the Marriage
This factor is becoming less important in making an equitable distribution of
assets. In Carrow v. Carrow,4" the court reversed a refusal by a chancellor to award
an equitable distribution on the grounds of adultery by a wife of twenty-nine
years.4" The court recognized that this adultery could be a factor in the amount of
the equitable distribution, but only if the misconduct placed "a burden on the sta-
bility and harmony of the marital and family relationship.""0 In Pierce v. Pierce,1
the court affirmed an award of fifty percent of a military retirement plan to a wife
who was guilty of adultery and who, in fact, was living with her" 'male business
partner and best friend.' "52
This approach to an equitable distribution is consistent with the view of adul-
tery and awards of periodic alimony. In Hammonds v. Hammonds, the court held
that post-divorce cohabitation did not, in and of itself, constitute a reason to
41. See Johnson v. Johnson, No. 92-CA-00957, 1994 WL 707269 (Miss. Dec. 21, 1994); Pierce v. Pierce,
648 So. 2d 523 (Miss. 1994); Ruffv. Ruff, 645 So. 2d 944 (Miss. 1994); Davis v. Davis, 643 So. 2d 931 (Miss.
1994).
42. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 934 (Miss. 1994).
43. 494 So. 2d 362 (Miss. 1986).
44. Id. at 364.
45. Id. at 363.
46. Id. at 362.
47. Id. at 365.
48. 642 So. 2d 901 (Miss. 1994).
49. Id. at 908.
50. Id. at 905.
51. 648 So. 2d 523 (Miss. 1994).
52. Id. at 527 (Lee, J., dissenting).
53. 641 So. 2d 1211 (Miss. 1994).
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terminate alimony.5' Alimony would only be affected if the cohabitation resulted
in a substantial change in the economic circumstances of the recipient. 5 In
Chamblee v. Chamblee, 6 the court stated: "In recent years, this court has been
moving away from using divorce proceedings as a means of punishing the party
adjudged to be at fault towards creating a more fair and equitable jurisprudence of
divorce law." 7
The teaching of these cases is that while adultery, if it impacts the stability of the
marriage, may be a factor in reducing equitable distribution or alimony awards, it
is not a complete bar to these awards. Given the court's emphasis on expert testi-
mony on valuation, we may have experts testifying about the value of an adulter-
ous affair. This should spice up the pages of the Southern Reporter.
Although on appeal the marital misconduct will not be a basis for reversing a
chancellor's finding, one must remember that many of the individual chancellors
view marital misconduct seriously and, at least subconsciously, will weigh that
factor heavily in making an award of equitable distribution or alimony. If the chan-
cellor justifies the opinion with a reasonable finding of fact, the decision would be
sustained on appeal.
The "quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage" have
often been factors in making an equitable distribution of assets by way of lump
sum alimony.5 8 Obviously, the longer the duration of the marriage, the greater the
amount of marital property.
3. Contribution to the Education, Training, or Other Accomplishment Bearing on
the Earning Power of the Spouse Accumulating These Assets
The court has long recognized this as a factor in making an award of lump sum
alimony, but the method of valuation of this contribution can best be described as
"pick a number." In Robinson v. Erwin,59 the wife had put the husband through law
school, had helped finance the opening of his law office, and had made other sub-
stantial contributions to the marital estate.6" The court reversed a lump sum award
of $5400 and remanded to the chancery court for reconsideration of the amount of
the award.61 In McIntosh v. McIntosh,62 under similar facts the chancellor had not
made an adequate award based upon the wife's contribution to the husband's edu-
cation, and the supreme court on appeal simply awarded the wife $10,000 as lump
sum alimony.6 In McNally v. McNally,64 the husband was unable to pay any lump
54. Id. at 1216.
55. Id.
56. 637 So. 2d 850 (Miss. 1994).
57. Id. at 863.
58. See Retzer v. Retzer, 578 So. 2d 580, 593 (Miss. 1990).
59. 546 So. 2d 683 (Miss. 1989).
60. Id. at 683, 686.
61. Id. at 686.
62. 378 So. 2d 629 (Miss. 1979).
63. Id. at 631.
64. 516 So. 2d 499 (Miss. 1987).
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sum, and the supreme court ordered the chancery court to keep the case open in
order to award periodic alimony at a subsequent time.6" This procedure, while it
may lead to future litigation, may be the only fair approach when the divorce oc-
curs shortly after the completion of the education or professional training of a
spouse.
Expert testimony will thus be required to value two separate intangibles: (1) the
value of the payee spouse's contribution to the education of the payor; and (2) the
value of the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets. This may re-
quire the testimony both of a business appraiser and a forensic economist.66
B. The Degree to Which Each Spouse Has Expended, Withdrawn, or
Otherwise Disposed of Marital Assets and Any Prior Distribution
of Such Assets by Agreement, Decree, or Otherwise
Numerous cases mention this as a factor, but the valuation of this conduct
presents a problem. It obviously influences the court.67 The valuation of a spouse's
prior dissipation of assets obviously would best be shown by an actual accounting
of the assets so disposed of. In extreme cases, injunctive relief may be available. 68
C. The Market Value and the Emotional Value of the Assets
Subject to Distribution
Here is where much of the action will take place. The court will require expert
testimony on the valuation of these assets. In Gray v. Gray,69 the concurring opin-
ion stated that "the equitable division of marital assets may be impossible to
achieve" without the opinion of such experts.7" In Carrow v. Carrow,7 1 the court
remanded a case to the chancellor stating that "[t]he appraisals of value on the dis-
puted items are either out of date or are untrustworthy."72 The valuation issues are
discussed in detail, infra.
D. The Value of Assets Not Ordinarily, Absent Equitable Factors
to the Contrary, Subject to Such Distribution, Such As Property
Brought to the Marriage by the Parties and Property Acquired by
Inheritance or Inter Vivos Gift by or to an Individual Spouse
This guideline should be considered in conjunction with another guideline: the
needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of
assets, income, and earning capacity.
65. Id. at 503.
66. See infra Part 11.E
67. See, e.g., Pratt v. Pratt, 623 So. 2d 258, 264 (Miss. 1993).
68. See Klumb v. Klumb, 194 So. 2d 221, 223 (Miss. 1967); see also Crockett & Patterson, supra note 2, at
87-91.
69. 638 So. 2d 488 (Miss. 1994).
70. Id. at 492.
71. 642 So. 2d901 (Miss. 1994).
72. Id. at 908.
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Ferguson specifically held that existing law was not altered, and the chancery
court could still award lump sum alimony.73 These two guidelines, read together,
place lump sum alimony in an equitable distribution context, and remind us not to
forget the remedy of lump sum alimony simply because equitable distribution is
available. This being so, the only differences between marital and separate assets
are: (1) separate assets are not subject to divestiture of title (but of course are sub-
ject to execution on a judgment); and (2) lack of fault and need play a greater role
in awarding a payment of lump sum alimony from separate assets than they do in
an equitable division of marital assets.
This additional guideline has as its basis the principle set out in Cheatham v.
Cheatham,74 the leading case on lump sum alimony, which stated that "the single
most important factor undoubtedly is the disparity of the separate estates." 75 Recall
that in awarding lump sum alimony, as distinguished from equitable distribution, a
judge considers the factors of both need and fault and is not restricted to the mari-
tal assets. It may be made from any asset in the hands of the payor spouse. Pre-
Ferguson decisions on lump sum alimony provide authority on this issue. Johnson
v. Johnson76 also provides guidance on this issue, and cogently sums it up as
follows:
If there are sufficient marital assets which, when equitably divided and considered
with each spouse's nonmarital assets, will adequately provide for both parties, no
more need be done. If the situation is such that an equitable division of marital prop-
erty, considered with each party's nonmarital assets, leaves a deficit for one party,
then alimony based on the value of nonmarital assets should be considered. This
process does not require divestiture of inherited or gift-acquired nonmarital prop-
erty.
77
This statement is consistent with the prior decision and makes sense. In all likeli-
hood, this will be the rule in future cases involving both lump sum alimony and
equitable distribution.
E. Tax and Other Economic Consequences, and Contractual or Legal
Consequences to Third Parties, of the Proposed Distribution
The tax consequences of proposed distributions have been recognized as a fac-
tor since Brabham v. Brabham,78 but have not made much of an impression on the
court. The only case in which such consequences were mentioned was in Draper v.
Draper,79 where a dissenting justice commented that, considering the tax conse-
quences of the withdrawal of funds from a pension plan, the paying spouse would
73. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994).
74. 537 So. 2d435 (Miss. 1988).
75. Id. at 438. See also White v. White, 557 So. 2d 480 (Miss. 1989).
76. No. 92-CA-00957, 1994 WL 707269 (Miss. Dec. 21, 1994).
77. Id. at *5 (footnote omitted).
78. 84 So. 2d 147, 153 (Miss. 1955).
79. 627 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1993).
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end up with a smaller estate than the payee spouse.8" This factor impressed neither
the chancellor nor the majority of the court. If an equitable distribution is made in
kind, then these problems will not be as acute. However, if a spouse is awarded an
in-kind distribution of an asset with a low basis and a high value, this should be
considered. Whenever an equitable division is based on the value of an asset, the
tax and other economic factors of being required to liquidate this asset should cer-
tainly be taken into account.
For instance, in McKee v. McKee,81 the court affirmed a lump sum award of
$1,250,000 but held that the payor could delay paying this amount to avoid an op-
pressive liquidation of large land holdings. 2 Also, the court should consider not
only the consequences of a forced liquidation, but also the tax consequences upon
a sale of an asset with a low basis and a high value to satisfy the award.
The problem of" 'contractual or legal consequences' to third parties" which
loomed as such a large problem in the dissent in Ferguson8" should have been re-
solved by the statement in the majority opinion that equitable distribution did not
create a vested interest in the payee spouse, and the assurances that claims of third
parties would not be affected.84 It will be interesting to see how the court handles
buy-sell agreements in the context of closely held corporations and partnerships,
particularly the valuation provisions.
F The Extent to Which Property Division May, with Equity to
Both Parties, Be Utilized to Eliminate Periodic Payments and
Other Potential Sources of Future Friction Between the Parties
This guideline, in contrast to the ones previously discussed, is new to
Mississippi jurisprudence. It obviously recognizes the increased economic inde-
pendence of women. The presence of this guideline, however, while expressing a
desirable end, does not negate the importance, nor availability, of periodic ali-
mony. Ferguson itself expressly stated that periodic alimony is available, and
Hemsley included an award of a substantial amount. As noted, in connection with
periodic alimony, fault, even adultery, is playing a decreasing role in the impor-
tance of this award.8" The court has emphasized that periodic alimony and child
support should be considered as part of the same award,8" and when one part of the
equation is increased, the other part must be decreased of necessity.
G. Any Other Factor Which in Equity Should Be Considered
As times and conditions change, new factors will come into play. Some of the
factors which the Mississippi courts have not dealt with are inter vivos gifts
80. Id. at 307 (McRae, J., dissenting).
81. 418 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1982).
82. Id. at 766.
83. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 946 (Miss. 1994) (McRae, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
84. Id. at 928.
85. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
86. See Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929.
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between the spouses and the lost opportunity costs of one spouse's economic sac-
rifices to enable the other spouse to increase his or her future earning capacity.
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, the question of valuation runs
through all of these factors. This important, complex, and fascinating topic is con-
sidered next.
II. VALUATION PRINCIPLES
The fundamental principle underlying value, whether a closely held business, a
professional practice, or the value of an education, is that value is driven by future
cash flows or their equivalent. Many confusing issues make application of this
principle difficult. An estimate of valuation of a business or opportunity to earn
income depends among other things on the purpose of the valuation exercise, who
is to receive certain benefits, and the relative size of the ownership interest. Unlike
publicly available securities valuation, experts do not agree on appropriate ways to
handle many of the issues involved with valuation of these businesses, practices,
or intangible assets. Controversial issues which make valuation difficult include
the standard of value, lack of information, lack of marketability, size of the asset to
be valued, and whether interest is one of control or minority. The resolution of
these controversies is especially relevant to matrimonial asset valuations.
A. Valuation Standards of Closely Held Businesses
Ferguson refers to the standard of value which is most often used: fair market
value. 87 Fair market value implies an arm's length deal between informed investors
who derive no special benefits from ownership. However, for marital dissolu-
tions, different valuation standards can result in very different appraisals.
For divorces, an alternative standard, called investment value, as well as the
fair value standard, is appropriate in some cases. Investment value88 is the value to
a specific investor, where fair market value is market value defined by informed
investors who receive no special benefits. Special benefits include perks of owner-
ship, unique costs of capital, and other characteristics which make investment
value different from fair market value. Investment value has special applications
in matrimonial cases. The operating spouse continues his or her job and retains an
excessive salary and other benefits offered by controlling the business. The busi-
ness or practice is worth more to one spouse than the fair market value to inves-
tors. Similarly, goodwill of a doctor's or lawyer's practice may not be sold, but it is
valuable to the working doctor or lawyer. Discounts for lack of marketability or a
minority interest may not be appropriate in these cases.
The third alternative standard, fair value, is most often used in valuations of
dissenting (usually minority) shareholders' rights. One difference between fair
value and fair market value is that discounts for lack of marketability are often not
87. Id.
88. See SHANNON P. PRATT, VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPAN-
IES 22, 26-28 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter PRATT, VALUING A BUSINESS]; SHANNON P. PRATT, VALUING SMALL
BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES 27-29 (1993) [hereinafter PRATT, VALUING SMALL BUSINESSES].
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applied to fair value cases. 89 Dissenting shareholders' rights depend on state stat-
utes, not Internal Revenue Service rules. The fair value standard may or may not
be relevant to marital situations.
B. Fair Market Value
Until Ferguson is modified, we must focus on fair market value, which, simply
put, is what a willing buyer would pay and what a willing seller would accept when
the former is not under any compulsion to buy and the latter is not under any com-
pulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts .
The fair market value of closely held companies is estimated using three basic
approaches: (1) the market or comparative value approach; (2) the earnings value
or discounted cash flow approach; and (3) the adjusted cost approach. Rebelwood
Ltd. v. Hinds County,91 an ad valorem tax case, discusses at length these three ap-
proaches, and Shannon Pratt demonstrates how these approaches are used to value
closely held businesses. Each of these approaches defines the value of an asset as
the difference between the fair market value of the asset minus liabilities.
Ferguson appears to emphasize the fair market value of assets. Justice Chuck
McRae's opinion discusses the need to ascertain the value of "net assets," or assets
minus liabilities.93
The market approach bases value on the market prices of comparable firms.
Market multiples of earnings or book value of similar traded companies are used to
establish value. As such, the market approach is typically based on the valuation
of minority interests, not control values. Financial analysis must ensure the com-
parability of the companies and their financial statements. For example, officer
salaries may be adjusted to reasonable levels, causing income to rise or fall from
reported levels. Market multiples of income, cash flow, or book value are applied
to respective values of the company to be valued. The market approach is perhaps
the most often-accepted method relied upon by courts to determine fair market
value. The comparable company sales are required to be comparable, but not iden-
tical. 4 The earnings value or discounted cash flow approach to estimating fair
market value bases value on the discounted value of the estimated future cash
flows generated by the business. These cash flows are available to equity holders
of a business, and may be calculated as follows: earnings after tax, plus deprecia-
tion, less necessary capital and working capital expenditures, less debt principal
payments, plus the estimated terminal value at the end of the analysis period.
These cash flows are discounted or capitalized using a rate of return which would
be required by investors. The discount rate must include a real interest rate, a
89. See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
90. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965).
91. 544 So. 2d 1356 (Miss. 1989).
92. PRATT, VALUING A BusINESS, supra note 88, at 22, 53-54, 83-85.
93. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 946 (Miss. 1994) (McRae, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
94. See Howell v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 573 So. 2d 754, 757 (Miss. 1990).
1995]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
premium for expected inflation, and a risk premium, and subjective analysis is re-
quired of the appraiser. The cash flows may be projected year by year into the fu-
ture, or a single year's cash flow may be assumed to be constant for future years.
Multiple year cash flows or a single year cash flow may be capitalized directly.
Direct capitalization is a device by which one capitalizes one year's income into an
indication of value. 9
The adjusted cost approach to estimating fair market value is also called the ad-
justed net value approach. This approach relies on estimates of the values of each
asset and liability category, with the value equal to the difference between the ad-
justed values of assets and liabilities. This approach may rely on appraisals of
fixed assets such as land for components of the going concern valuation. Liquida-
tion value is generally not relevant in adjusted book value valuations, unless the
business is being liquidated, not to be sold as a going concern. The adjusted cost
value method is best used for holding company valuations and is of limited appli-
cability in divorce cases.
The most authoritative guide to the fair market value of stock in closely held
companies is Revenue Ruling 59-60,"6 issued in 1959, which was initially applied
only to estate and gift tax valuations of stock in closely held companies. In 1965, it
became applicable for any tax-related valuation,97 and now some states have ac-
cepted it as a guide in equitable distributions. This ruling, which codifies the ap-
plication of good economic theory, requires the consideration of several factors:
(1) the nature of the business and the history of the enterprise;
(2) the economic outlook and the outlook for the specific industry;
(3) the book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business;
(4) the earnings capacity of the company or the present value of future cash
flows discounted at the appropriate discount rate;
(5) the dividend paying capacity;
(6) whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible factors;
(7) sales of stock and the size of the block to be valued; and
(8) the market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or a similar
line of business having their stocks traded actively in a free and open market.98
Actual transactions in the stock of the closely held firms represent important
evidence of fair market value. Transactions must be between informed sellers and
buyers of a similar size to the block size being valued. Size and marketability of the
closely held firm must be considered.
95. Crocker v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 534 So. 2d 549, 553 n.3 (Miss. 1988).
96. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
97. See Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327.
98. Rev. Ru|. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237.
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C. Discounts for Lack of Marketability
Discounts for lack of marketability are generally applied to closely held busi-
ness values when the firm is compared to publicly-traded companies99 with the
market approach. Closely held business interests cannot be quickly sold for cash at
the owner's volition. Once a market comparison value of a business or practice is
established, it is appropriate to apply a discount for lack of marketability, which
averages thirty to thirty-five percent. Discounts are not applied for valuations
based on the discounted cash flow or adjusted cost approaches. If the basis for the
closely held company valuation is a comparison with minority interests of public
companies, a discount for lack of marketability is appropriate, but it is not appro-
priate to discount for a minority interest. The minority interest discount is already
exhibited in the publicly-traded stock.
Minority interest deals with the interest being valued compared with the value
of the enterprise. The degree of control over the enterprise is the primary factor
affecting the effect of a minority interest on valuation of the business or practice
being valued. Minority interests are worth less than controlling interests when val-
ued by the fair market value standard. Marital cases involve a fifty percent inter-
est, each with equal control. Such situations present complicated valuation issues.
The best examples of minority interests are shares of stock traded in public mar-
kets like the New York Stock Exchange. When corporations are taken over, corpo-
rate control is transferred. Control premiums averaging twenty to fifty percent are
often required over the minority interest prices. If valuation of closely held com-
panies is based on sales of control transactions of comparable companies, then a
minority interest discount is appropriate for non-control blocks of stock. Further-
more, a discount for lack of marketability may also be appropriate. While this dis-
count may be appropriate in market comparison approach valuations, the discount
may not be appropriate for professional practice valuations.
D. Professional Practice Valuation
Values of professional practices and other service firms are affected by the
same factors as closely held businesses, but the valuation process must be modi-
fied to account for the specific characteristics of risk and return of the firm or
practice being valued. For instance, in insurance, accounting, advertising, securi-
ties, or consulting firms or practices, the customer base and the employee base are
of more importance. The appraiser must consider whether customers are repeat
buyers and the loyalty of customers to the firm or to certain individuals. Medical,
dental, and law practices may have goodwill valuation components. The goodwill
may have value even when the practice cannot be sold. The "key-person" factor is
especially important for small firms and practices. If an individual is key to the
success of a business or practice, a significant discount is warranted to the value.
99. See Rev. Rul. 77-287, 1977-2 C.B. 319.
1995]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW
Individuals, firms, or practices may possess goodwill, an excess of market
value over asset value. Goodwill may be either professional or business practice
goodwill. Business practice goodwill is associated with the location, staff, and cli-
ent base of the practice or entity. Professional goodwill derives from the personal
reputation for judgment, skill, and knowledge of an individual. 100
In an important case, Lopez v. Lopez,1 o the value of goodwill in a divorce situa-
tion was considered. Professional goodwill was said to be determined by the pro-
fessional's age, past earning power, reputation, comparative success, and the
nature and duration of his practice. 102 Professional goodwill, compared to practice
goodwill, is more difficult to transfer to a buyer. The Mississippi courts have of-
fered no guidelines on this subject. In fact, in Tutor v. Tutor,103 a case in which
goodwill was obviously present, it was not mentioned. Goodwill is difficult to
value, and depends on factors such as future earnings, competition, referrals or
clients, riskiness of the practice, staff, age and work habits of the professional,
marketability of the business practice, and similar considerations.
Professional practices may be valued using several approaches. The excess
earnings or Treasury method approach 0 4 to goodwill valuation estimates the earn-
ings in excess of earnings in an average comparative practice. These excess earn-
ings are then capitalized at rates which often vary between twenty and one hundred
percent, which correspond to multiples of' one to five times, respectively. Other
methods of professional practice valuation include the sales multiple or cash flow
multiple approaches, sell or buy-in formulas when they exist, and comparative
transaction approaches. Sales multiple approaches are often used when value is
positive, but current earnings are negative. Formula approaches are most relevant
to sales for the purpose of the formula (e.g., a buyout), and may be misleading for
divorce valuation purposes. Comparative transaction sales prices can be impor-
tant guides to valuation.
E. Valuation of Projected Earnings
Economists view a marriage as an institution where partners exchange their
goods or services.10 5 Economic theory may be used to establish values of such
marital property as pensions, household services, the economic value of an edu-
cation, the cost of marriage to the homemaker, and the cost of raising a child. Fo-
rensic economists estimate such values by combining an individual's professional
and economic attributes with national average statistics to project future earnings.
Similar methods may be used to estimate foregone earnings of a non-working
spouse. The projected earnings are then reduced to present value form. These
100. See PRATT, VALUING SMALL BUSINESSES, supra note 88, at 295.
101. 38 Cal. App. 3d 93 (Ct. App. 1974).
102. Id. at 109.
103. 494 So. 2d 362 (Miss. 1986).
104. See Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327.
105. Jerome M. Staller, Use of Home Economist in Valuation of Marital Property, in VALUATION AND DISTRIBU-
TION OF MARITAL PROPERTY 1, 3 (Maris Warfmun & Matthew Bender eds., 1994).
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methods are extensively used in personal injury, wrongful death, and commercial
litigation cases. 06
E Use of Appraisers and Forensic Economists
Valuation specialists can be found through their various professional associa-
tions. Valuing a Business0 7 is an excellent source of valuation information. The
following is a list, though not extensive, of some sources of experts and research
aides.
The Association for Investment Management and Research (P.O. Box 7947,
Charlottesville, Virginia 22906) sponsors the Chartered Financial Analyst pro-
gram, which is a widely recognized three-year sequential study and examination
program for the practice of financial analysis. Charter holders must also have
three years experience in financial analysis, including portfolio management and
investment analysis, and adhere to standards of professional conduct. Members in-
clude securities firm research analysts and corporate finance specialists, equity
and fixed income portfolio managers, finance professors, and other allied invest-
ment professionals. The organization publishes the Financial Analysts Journal.
Chartered Financial Analysts provide valuation opinions on publicly-traded and
closely held securities. Securities firms routinely provide fairness opinions and
valuations of initial public offerings.
The American Society of Appraisers, through its Business Valuation Commit-
tee, sets standards and sponsors professional designation, which requires exami-
nations and experience. Members specialize in the valuation of closely held
businesses and practices, as well as valuation of other assets. The Business
Valuation Review is published quarterly by the Business Valuation Committee.
Certified Public Accountants have long been interested in related work to their
chief lines of business - audit and tax work. Today public accounting firms are de-
veloping consulting specialties in valuation of closely held companies. Journals
such as the CPA Journal and The Practical Accountant contain articles on the
subject.
Forensic economists are members of various professional associations of fi-
nance, economics, and accounting which provide directories of college and uni-
versity professors as well as professional members. Some of the scholarly journals
are: Journal of Forensic Economics, published by the National Association of
Forensic Economics (P.O. Box 30067, Kansas City, Missouri 64112) and the
Journal of Legal Economics, published by the American Academy of Economic
and Financial Experts (P.O. Box 5077, Huntsville, Alabama 35632).
106. See Shaw v. Ladner, 447 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Miss. 1984); Graham v. City of Kosciusko, 339 So. 2d 60,
62 (Miss. 1976); Boyd Constr. Co. v. Bilbro, 210 So. 2d 637, 643 (Miss. 1968).
107. PRATT, VALUING A BUSINESS, supra note 88.
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III. CONCLUSION
The adoption of equitable distribution in Mississippi was a logical step in the
development of case law governing the division of property in the event of divorce.
That doctrine recognizes the property rights of the payee spouse to the marital
property, rather than the duty of support arising from the marital relationship. The
lack of emphasis on fault and need, and increase of emphasis on valuation of eco-
nomic contributions and of the assets involved, will transform divorce cases into
what they should be: commercial disputes measuring the economic contributions
of parties to the accumulation of the assets involved, rather than domestic disputes
imposing society's moral values on dollar and cents issues. Professional appraisers
will replace private investigators and prying neighbors as the key witnesses. This
should make the cases less emotional and easier to settle. If, however, they are
tried, they may be more expensive, but at least the focus will be on what the litiga-
tion is really about-money. Fairness, rather than punishment, should be the busi-
ness of the divorce court.
The Ferguson guidelines are not new; they are based either on Mississippi prec-
edent or precedent from other equitable distribution jurisdictions. The fair market
value standard is prescribed by Ferguson, and experts are required to deal with
several valuation issues which must be resolved, such as goodwill valuation, the
applicability of discounts for lack of marketability, the valuation of liabilities, or
net assets, and the valuation of household services. The guidelines are workable,
and, if followed, should yield reasonably fair decisions. This is about as much as
one can hope for in divorce cases.
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